Commentary
In this early passage in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle summarises his famous Doctrine of the Mean, arguing that virtues (and the actions which virtuous agents aim at) are found between two extremes, with the happy intermediate state being where ethical excellence (ethike arete) lies. There are two aspects of this account which are particularly deserving of scrutiny: first, the nature of the mean and in what way it is “relative to us”, and second, the connection between virtue and deliberation about the mean. An appreciation that Aristotle’s conception of a mean (or meson) is far more complex than the mathematical connotations in English imply can help us understand why Aristotle emphasises reason and decision in this passage, while also revealing the underlying triviality of his view, in that it does not give us much fresh insight into either virtue or correct action.
The passage quoted above follows a section where Aristotle sketches out, by analogy with an athlete’s training, the kind of mean he is talking about. Just as the right quantity of food to for a trainer to prescribe is not necessarily the arithmetic average of some amount which is too much and some other which is too little but may instead depend on the context, he says, the mean aimed at by virtue is similarly not “one and the same for all” (1106a30-b8). One might take this to be an endorsement of some form of moral relativism: perhaps Aristotle is claiming that the path of virtue and excellence differs significantly between each of us, like how different athletes all have their own regimen. The qualification that virtue consists in a mean “relative to us” does seem to provide decisive support for this interpretation. As Brown (1997) argues, however, concluding that Aristotle is a relativist about ethike arete is a misreading of both this passage and the wider context. Note how Aristotle makes clear that the mean is defined in terms of the reason of the prudent person – their judgement is taken as the normative standard by which all decisions are judged. So, it would be perplexing if agent-relative considerations somehow had a bearing on what the mean is. Things become clearer if we recall Aristotle’s lengthy discussion about function (ergon) and the good life in Book I, where he concludes that flourishing is the same as performing one’s ergon well. In this light, it is far more natural to read the phrase “relative to us” as referring to the specific human ergon and mode of flourishing (i.e., the exercise of reason), and thereby capturing Aristotle’s conviction that virtue is good for the possessor (Brown 1997, p88). Since all humans have the same ergon, the mean differs between individuals only because of differences in the specific situation. If our athlete were a runner, then his trainer would recommend a different diet to if he were a wrestler; likewise, if you are wealthy the mean in generosity is different to if you are impoverished (Brown 1997, 86). Whilst the mean is not the same for all, that does not imply that there is relativism about ethike arete, or no right course of action in any given scenario.
We can further our understanding of the mean and why it is not “one” by looking at how Aristotle refers back to it when discussing the individual virtues in later books. The idea that the mean encapsulates more than a mere action is a recurrent theme: he says that one must show bravery about “the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time”, and makes a similar comment about generosity (1115b16-17 and 1120b3-5). As Hursthouse (2006, 108) puts it, hitting the mean requires the appropriate choice of a great many different parameters. In this light, it is clear that the mean is not merely the taking of an optimal course of action, but also about being guided by the rational faculties towards promoting the proper end of flourishing – hence Aristotle’s explicit mention of how virtue involves “decid[ing]” (Lorenz 2009, 185). There is therefore a crucial distinction to be drawn between doing the virtuous action, on one hand, and acting virtuously, on the other. Aristotle concerns himself primarily with the latter, which is harder to achieve and requires that actions and feelings flow from deliberation aimed at the right goals. This ability to decide well, developed through careful practice and habituation, is what marks out a virtuous individual.
Having clarified what the Doctrine of the Mean really claims, let us now turn to a brief evaluation of Aristotle’s account. One attraction is that it provides a clear justification for why we ought to admire and praise the virtuous: they have achieved the feat of solving an extremely complicated task, in aiming at the fine and taking carefully considered actions to promote that goal. However, his account also has two significant flaws. First, the doctrine just seems trivial: certainly, one should not have an excess or deficiency in a character trait; excesses and deficiencies are, by definition, bad. We have established that Aristotle doesn’t hold the (implausible) view that the correct intermediate value is just a numerical midpoint, but this means that his claim that one attains an extremity in the “the best and the good” by cultivating a character without excesses or deficiencies borders on vacuous – reframed in the language of optimisation, it is hardly groundbreaking to say that the maximum value of a function is attained when its inputs are neither too large nor too small. Moreover, the Doctrine of the Mean contributes almost nothing in the way of practical guidance about how someone aiming at virtue should conduct themselves, even though Aristotle is clear that one of the aims of the Nicomachean Ethics is to furnish readers with such advice. Although he goes on to discuss various specific virtues of character in subsequent books, these later recommendations do not hinge on any insight from the Doctrine of the Mean (Hursthouse 2006, 105). Indeed, Aristotle suggests that an imperfectly virtuous agent would do well to aim towards a vice which is opposed to their current defect of character, as opposed to trying to reach the mean and excellence directly (e.g., 1109b1-5) – but practical guidance is rather separate from the central claim of this passage that virtue consists in aiming at the mean between two vices. As laid out in the quoted passage, then, the Doctrine of the Mean not only fails to tell us anything new about the character of a virtuous individual, it is also unhelpful in showing aspirationally virtuous agents what path to take.
To conclude, the Doctrine of the Mean as presented in this passage is about the use of reason and deliberation to reach the right action in pursuit of the right goal, ultimately promoting human flourishing. While few would object to the idea that a virtuous individual meets these conditions, the doctrine provides extremely limited substantive insights into what the mean comprises in any given situation, or how individuals ought to attain this ethike arete.
References
Brown, Lesley. 1997. ‘What is the Mean Relative to Us in Aristotle’s Ethics?,’ Phronesis 42, 77–93. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4182546
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 2006. ‘The Central Doctrine of the Mean,’ in Kraut (ed.) Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch4
Lorenz, Hendrik. 2009. ‘Virtue of Character in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 37, 177–212. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199575565.003.0005
Tutor’s feedback
This is a well-written piece, and I think you have overall done an excellent job at fulfilling the ‘critical commentary’ prompt. Depending on the quotation given in the exam, it will not be possible for you to address each and every aspect of it. Structuring your comment and discussion by indicating what you consider to be most crucial—and explaining and justifying why these issues are most important—will be indispensable in doing well at this exercise. Your exposition of the key idea and doctrine behind the passage is good; here it is just important to be as precise as possible in one’s formulations and the relations that one draws to other aspects of the Ethics. I have indicated a few points above where this could be improved. When it comes to the critical appraisal, there are a few more possibilities of improvement: First, the claim which you announced in the introduction, that clarifying some misconceptions about the doctrine reveals its inherent triviality, has not really made an explicit appearance after that. In principle, claims and ideas like this can connect the expository and critical part of your comment very nicely, so I would encourage you to keep them in mind as you write the piece and make them explicit. Second, the positive appraisal might be given more space. While it is good and perhaps even demanded that you take a clear position on the issue, there might be some more room for your reception of the passage to be more charitable. Lastly, while the general thrust of your objections is very good and interesting, I think that both should have been rendered more precise and sketched out a little more. Some of this we can do in the tutorial, and we can also talk more about how best to approach this kind of writing task under exam conditions.