Happiness and function

Does Aristotle establish any connection between what is distinctive of a human being and what makes for a good human life? (2000 Q2)

• Yes, Aristotle does establish a connection between what is distinctive of a human being and what makes for a good human life, although it is not as deductive as his argument in Book I makes it appear. There are three routes for the connection to be drawn: directly via the function argument, automatically via his teleological worldview, and indirectly via the characterisation of virtue as about the fine found throughout NE
• Context: Aristotle and other philosophers at the time had a teleological worldview. Everything had a purpose (telos) and its doing well constituted in completing that purpose.
  • Book I has function argument, setting up eudaimonia (flourishing) as being the same as living well / doing well, and that this consists in performing the distinctly human function well.
  • Rest of NE examines the nature of eudaimonia and how it can be attained; meant to be a practical guide.
• The function argument in I is the most direct argumentative route towards establishing the connection. Charles 4-part decomposition:
  • [A] A human being has a function (ergon) and that function is the unique characteristic activity
  • [B] The activity unique to humans is rational activity in accordance with virtue
  • [C] To be a good human is to perform the human function well
  • [D] If one carries out the human function well, one attains good for oneself
• There are at least two problems with the argument in establishing this connection though
  • [B] might just be false (as I’ll discuss below)
  • The step from [C] to [D] equivocates between what it is to be a good-X and to be good-for-X
    • Example: a battle horse
• Insofar as you already accept the teleological worldview, [B] and the step from [C] to [D] will seem obvious to you, and so the connection is automatic.
  • But as Charles argues, Aristotle doesn’t really pursue the metaphysical argument in NE. Indeed, he warns to not seek too much precision in political science, implying he doesn’t think metaphysics gives the right tools.
  • Seen in this light, it’s more like the function argument is setting out the connection Aristotle believes exists. But he doesn’t really use it as an argumentative device, at least not to a neutral interlocutor.
• The more successful route is what Aristotle pursues through the whole of NE: establish that (i) there is a distinctive activity of a human being, which is rational activity in accordance with virtue, (ii) that activity in accordance with virtue is fine (kalon), and (iii) a virtuous person finds the fine pleasant, and thereby attains eudaimonia.
• (i) Can we can pick out what’s distinctive of a human being, i.e. does an ergon exist?
  • There’s an abortive inductive argument from carpenters and eyes, which obviously fails and scholars don’t take seriously.
  • Better: positively identify what the ergon is. Aristotle says rational activity.
    • Two concerns: (1) this isn’t the only unique activity to humans, (2) the gods do rational activity too!
  • Reply: A life-activity is individuated by the activity itself and what it controls, and the function is the life-activity unique to Xs whose being done well distinguishes an excellent X. (Charles)
    • We get uniqueness from the combination of intellectual reasoning and controlling perception etc
    • From endoxa it distinguishes an excellent X
  • Alternatively, we can take a revisionist view and identify the ergon as specifically practical reasoning, leaving out theoria (Wilkes).
  • Either way, we can satisfy (i)
• (ii) and (iii) are what he spends the remainder of NE talking about.
  • Virtue is done for the sake of the fine/noble.
    • You might object that it’s unclear what grounds the fine, but theories need to bottom out somewhere.
  • Aristotle thinks that the virtuous agent has an internal harmony where they find it pleasant to do the fine, i.e. their appetitive part of the soul desires the fine.
    • The main weakness is here: it’s not obvious that doing the fine is pleasant, cf bravery.
    • Saying that virtue is pleasant insofar as it attains the fine doesn’t really get you there – if it’s noble to die for one’s country, that still doesn’t explain why it’s pleasant.
• Conclusion: Aristotle doesn’t establish a necessary / logical connection, but he does argue through endoxa / intuitions about what is fine that a good human life might plausibly consist in performing the distinctive human activities well.
  • And if you do accept the metaphysics in the background, the connection is self-evident.

‘I prefer to lead the life of a grazing animal’. Could Aristotle convince me otherwise? (2019 Q1)

• Aristotle might persuade you that your life could involve more of the fine (to kalon) by doing otherwise, but he would struggle to convince you that your life goes worse unless you were already of the view that the fine is the ultimate good.
• Book I, function argument:
  • [A] Everything has a function (ergon), and that function is to perform the unique characteristic activity of the species.
  • [B] As a member of species X, it is performing one’s function well that constitutes being a good X.
  • [C] Performing one’s function well leads one to attain the good for oneself.
  • [D] The human function is rational activity in accordance with virtue.
• The argument on its own would not be convincing to you; really it’s just a restatement of his background teleological worldview.
  • There are obvious problems: the step from [B] to [C], and also premiss [D].
  • Battle horses; uniqueness issues.
• But what might be more convincing is the approach taken through the remainder of the NE.
  • Aristotle appeals to endoxa about what is blameworthy and praiseworthy to deduce what is virtuous. And he also tries to show that the life of the virtuous person is both pleasant and fine.
• The life of a grazing animal would be lacking in many kinds of activities that only humans can engage in:
  • Philosophical contemplation
  • Friendship
  • Generosity, bravery, temperance, etc
• But if you believe that those activities are of no value, then Aristotle would struggle to persuade you.
• [any more to say?]

Post-Claude & examiner report notes

• Key point: Aristotle thinks that argument is not very capable of changing our preferences.
  • Talk about habituation and the need to have been brought up in fine habits (I.4, II.1-4)
  • X.9 on moral education
    • Those who live by passion won’t listen to an argument that dissuades them; law and compulsion are needed
    • “It is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed as a result of people’s characters… the soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely”
• This is actually an explicit reference to I.5 (1095b19–20), where Aristotle talks about how the life of pleasure is slavish and “fit for grazing animals”.
  • So, ought to connect it to Aristotle’s function argument (I.7) about why the life of pleasure is not the best for a human being.
• If Aristotle is an inclusivist about eudaimonia, then the grazing animal position does have some share of eudaimonia (because it includes pleasure), but they’re missing out on the best part.

Can a bee be virtuous? Can it be happy? (2020 Q3)

• No, on Aristotle’s account a bee could not be virtuous; it could be happy in the narrow sense of experiencing pleasure, but not in the sense of eudaimonia (or “flourishing”). Aristotle’s account aligns with commonsense intuitions.
• Aristotle says that virtue “is a state which decides, consisting in a mean relative to us, defined by reference to reason”.
  • So for a bee to be virtuous, it must (at a minimum) be capable of decision (prohairesis).
  • But this certainly fails. A decision is a deliberative desire to do an action which is up to us.
    • (On Aristotle’s account) animals cannot deliberate and thus lack the capacity to form a decision.
    • More plausibly: some animals can deliberate, perhaps some cephalopods and mammals. But it seems pretty unlikely that bees could deliberate.
• To make the counterargument: bees are social animals; they live in complex societies; perhaps there is some way for them to be “vicious bees” who e.g. steal their neighbour’s honey, and equally to avoid that. But that appears rather unlikely.
• Regarding happiness, Aristotle uses the word eudaimonia to describe the highest human good; it’s synonymous with living well (eu zen) and doing well (eu prattein).
  • You might argue that a bee can fulfil its function and thereby attain happiness
    • Brief outline of function argument, characteristic activity, some candidates could be pollinating and making honey?
    • [yeah could a bee get eudaimonia?]
  • But this is a very different sort of eudaimonia than the human’s. It’s as good as the bee can get, but nonetheless lesser in some sense (e.g. doesn’t involve the divine good of theoria).
  • Happiness in the more restricted sense of pleasure is quite easy. But that’s not what Aristotle meant

Post-Claude & examiner report notes

• Be careful!! There might be virtues specific to bees, which don’t require reason and are instead the result of a bee performing its function well.
  • Aristotle talks about horses and eyes having virtues, in his inductive argument.
  • The II.6 definition is about human virtue, not virtue in general.
• So bee-virtue might very well be a thing.
  • E.g., the function to be done excellently could be pollinating, serving the hive, etc.
  • Horse-virtue doesn’t require reason; no need for bee-virtue to either.
• Some arguments against: normally virtue-talk is reserved for humans and gods.
  • And II.6 seems to make decision constitutive of virtue proper (rather than virtue by analogy only)
• Distinguish between the different senses of “happy” in English
  • Experiencing pleasure – yes, trivially possible
  • Flourishing (eudaimonia) – no, not on Aristotle’s account
    • X.8: “the other animals have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity [as theoria]”
  • Living in accordance with nature/telos
• Aristotle distinguishes humans from other social animals (including bees) because we can perceive justice/injustice. So we’re more political than they are.

‘If dolphins or Martians also reasoned, would it be any the less our function to reason?’ (WILLIAMS) How would Aristotle answer this question? Does his answer undermine the Function Argument? (2018 Q2)

• This question is similar to the challenges that Aristotle faces for how, given that he thinks the gods reason, it can be the human function.
• Why might this be a difficulty for Aristotle at all?
  • He wants to show that humans have a unique human function, and that the well-performance of this is what distinguishes an excellent human, but moreover constitutes one’s own happiness.
  • Sketch of the function argument
    • 1. Humans have a unique characteristic life activity
    • 2. That activity is the exercise of reason
    • 3. It marks out an excellent human when they do this activity well, in accordance with the virtues proper to humans
    • 4. In being an excellent human, one attains happiness for oneself (given suitable external goods).
  • His teleological worldview might seem to make the conclusion of the argument immediately true, but he doesn’t rely on the metaphysics in NE
    • Instead, the whole book is more of an argument that there is a human function, and that by fulfilling it well, one will have a pleasant life.
• The replies can use similar strategies.
  • Charles – a function is a characteristic life-activity. And these are individuated by (i) the activity itself, but also (ii) the sorts of activities they control.
    • (Though this looks a little gerrymandered)
  • Dolphins’ and Martians’ lives presumably involve in different sorts of activities to humans. For example, swimming, or flying, or whatever they do.
• It’s not even clear that the uniqueness of human activity is that important.
  • Sure, then virtues for humans might be similar to virtue for dolphins or Martians, but that doesn’t seem so bad? Especially if they’re very similar to us!

Post-Claude & examiner report notes

• The objection is partly based on the fact that the way Aristotle identifies reason as the human function is by ruling out other candidates for being shared with other beings
  • Nutrition is shared with plants; perception shared with animals
• Whiting is a specific philosopher who concedes that uniqueness is unnecessary
  • The idea: functions specify an essential but not necessarily unique activity
  • Aristotle’s peeling-away of nutrition / perception was not because the function has to be unique, but rather just that it illustrates those aren’t essential to humans.
    • So uniqueness is a heuristic for identifying the essential activity; it’s not loadbearing in the argument

*? To what extent does happiness depend on luck or good fortune, on Aristotle’s account? (2020 Q12)

*? ‘As far as its name goes, most people agree that the highest good is happiness. But they disagree about what happiness is.’ Does Aristotle in book I of the Nicomachean Ethics offer reasonable criteria for settling this disagreement? (2021 Q1)

‘Only a complete life is happy, so I cannot be happy while I am still alive. But the dead have no share in good or evil, so I cannot be happy once my life is complete. Therefore, I cannot be happy.’ What, if anything, is wrong with this interpretation of Aristotle? (2022 Q1)

• Present out as an argument with premisses.
• This seems to equivocate between two meanings of complete: (i) completed, i.e. reached its conclusion; (ii) involving all the goods worth having.
  • On reading (ii), the first “so…” claim obviously doesn’t follow.
  • On reading (i), which does seem to be what Solon meant, since he claims that you can’t conclude someone is happy until their life is over, there’s just a different equivocation at play: whether you can judge someone to be happy, or whether they in fact are.
• For Aristotle the key point is that happiness is an activity. So of course the dead have no share in it – but someone living well (eu zen) is happy, because their life involves everything that’s worth having.
• External goods are required, because these are conditions for you to be able to exercise virtue.
• But happiness of this sort is a stable state, not something changing like weather / the seasons.

Post-Claude & examiner report notes

• There is an equivocation, but rather than (ii) it’s with (i*): a full/whole life, of adequate extent [vs a life that’s over]
  • And then, Aristotle’s point is that a life reaches its telos by being lived fully, not by the person becoming a corpse
• Also worth properly dealing with Aristotle’s idea that descendants’ fortunes can affect the dead, but only in a weak and unimportant way
  • So he would deny P2 also, that the dead have no share in good & evil
• And bring in Priam too – the point is that it partly vindicates Solon’s claim that external goods matter, without really conceding much
  • Nobility shines through; the virtuous person won’t be made wretched (athlios) even by misfortune

Is it coherent of Aristotle to claim that I can choose virtuous actions for themselves and for the sake of happiness? (2022 Q2)

• Yes, because there are two senses of “for the sake of” at work here.
• The idea is that virtuous actions are chosen for their own sake (i.e. non-instrumentally), but for the sake of happiness in a constitutive sense.
  • In doing virtuous actions, according to Aristotle, one attains happiness.
• If you thought the second was an instrumental reading, that it might still be coherent to maintain both – but it would risk egoism objections.
  • For example, I might choose to make a painting partly for the sake of the painting (and its intrinsic beauty), but partly for the sake of earning a living
  • The trouble is, if you choose virtuous actions with the goal of happiness in mind, that seems not to be how a virtuous person would be inclined.

Post-Claude & examiner report notes

• Flag where this claim comes from
  • Aristotle says at I.7 1097b2–6 that we choose every virtue for its own sake as well as happiness; happiness we never choose for the sake of anything else (it’s the most complete good)
• Worth spelling out what the constitutive sense is, and can actually distinguish between three sorts of “for the sake of”:
  • For the sake of itself
  • For the sake of a separately-generated causal product
    • This is a (possibly-contingent) causal connection
    • For example, being brave and winning a battle
    • This sort of connection is neither necessary nor sufficient for the good to be obtained.
  • For the sake of a whole it (partially or wholly) constitutes
    • This is an indefeasible, essential connection
• Do need to talk about the exclusivist vs inclusivist readings of eudaimonia, at least a bit.
  • The way this question is framed, you could clarify that theoria is among the virtuous actions (it’s just activity in accordance with the virtue sophia)
    • So regardless of which reading you have, virtuous activity makes up eudaimonia, either in whole or as the dominant part.
  • However, if you take a strict exclusivist pro-theoria view (where practical virtue is a mere causal means towards eudaimonia, not constitutive of it), then the virtues are chosen instrumentally.
    • Even this isn’t incoherent, though! Cf the painting: you can take an action for its own sake as well as instrumentally.
    • It does deepen the egoism/“one thought too many” worry, though: you’re doing the brave act as a means to your own future contemplation.
    • And also, it seems to fit poorly with I.7 where Aristotle lists virtue alongside honour, pleasure, and understanding as things chosen both for themselves and for eudaimonia – looks like they’re of similar importance, not that theoria is lexically better/etc.
• The way to think of external goods here: they’re preconditions for happiness
  • Remember that Aristotle is very clear that happiness is not identical with virtue.
    • The former is an activity, the latter a state.
  • Rather, happiness is the exercise of virtue.
    • (But other things might constitute it too – e.g., activity of friendship; maybe pleasure)
  • And in order for virtue to be exercised, you need certain background conditions – e.g., if you’re impoverished you can’t exercise generosity; if you’re exiled you can’t have relations with other humans at all; etc