It’s a mean with respect to fear and confidence (III.6, 1115a6-7), though Aristotle thinks that they are not really opposites.
The excessively fearless has no name, whereas the excessively confident is rash (III.7, 1115b24-9) [see also Irwin?]
Understanding bravery can help us grasp the relationship between pleasure and virtue. The exercise of bravery isn’t necessarily pleasant. [see week 8 readings & essay too]
The brave person finds death & wounds painful, and is unwilling in suffering them but still endures it. Indeed, Aristotle says that the happiest/most virtuous people will feel the most pain at death, because their life is so valuable.
“It is not true, then, in the case of every virtue that is active exercise is pleasant; it is pleasant only insofar as we attain the end” (III.9, 1117b15-16)
So Aristotle seems to be saying that the virtuous person finds the overall action-situation pleasant, because ultimately they attain the fine & are satisfied by that, but not necessarily pleasant at the moment of acting.
This is in tension with the idea of enjoying the virtuous action, though.
Active engagement is what matters, not passive.
You’re only brave when you’re using your strength, or when being killed is fine; misfortunes (e.g. death at sea, or sickness) don’t count (III.6, 1115b4-6)
Bravery is found “above all [in] the dangers of war” (III.6, 1115a32-35)
The fear & confidence needs to be about the right kinds of things.
“Fear of some bad things, such as bad reputation, is actually right and fine, and lack of fear is shameful; for if someone fears bad reputation he is decent and properly prone” (III.6, 1115a12-16)
We can grasp what’s required for virtue by looking at examples of apparent but non-genuine bravery:
Ordinary citizens standing firm in order to avoid penalty and win honour [vs for the fine] (III.8, 1116a18-19)
Soldiers who stand their ground only because they believe they have the upper hand, but run away if defeat looks likely (III.8, 1116b15-23)
People acting on spirit (thumon) alone (III.8, 1116b23-1117a5).
People who are overly optimistic “because they think they are stronger and nothing could happen to them” (NE III.8, 1117a9-14)
People who act in ignorance, and then run away when they realise how things really are
Aristotle’s particular admiration of bravery in emergency situations seems at odds with his remarks that virtue is a state which decides.
“someone who is unafraid and unperturbed in the moment seems braver than [someone who is unafraid only] when he is warned in advance; for his action proceeds more from his state of character, because it proceeds less from preparation” (III.8, 1117a17-22)
Perhaps the point is that we have more evidence about this person’s good character from how they behave in emergencies.
But it is strange for him to say “if we are warned in advance, we might decide what to do [not only because of our state of character, but] also by reason and rational calculation”: surely the virtuous person is able to act bravely in emergencies, and when doing so they do use reason & calculation.
Maybe this is a place for eustochia (grasping the right action quickly without deliberation)?
Magnanimity (megalopsychia), the virtue associated with a certain kind of greatness.
It’s a mean between vanity and pusillanimity; Aristotle thinks the latter is especially to be avoided as “it arises more often and is worse” (IV.3, 1125a32-4).
The magnanimous person “thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them”.
So, it’s not only about the agent’s actions and feelings being intermediate – there’s also an objective standard to it, where they need to be at an extreme of worthiness.
He accepts that magnanimity is of a different status to the other virtues.
It’s an “adornment” on the virtues, as it “makes them greater and it does not arise without them” (IV.3, 1124a1-3); comparison to beauty which – Aristotle thinks – requires a large body, even if small people can be attractive and well proportioned.
The corresponding vices “do not bring reproaches, since they do no harm to one’s neighbours and are not too disgraceful” (IV.2, 1123a31-33), though perhaps this is descriptive not prescriptive?
There’s a lot that seems almost laughable about his account to modern readers: the magnanimous agent moves slowly, has a deep voice, etc.
This might be a methodological problem with starting from endoxa.
MacIntyre especially objects, saying that Aristotle paints an “appalling picture of the crown of the virtuous life”.
The fact that it’s an adornment on the virtues is a challenge to his unity argument: it’s a second-order virtue, which we might think don’t exist.
Temperance
A mean concerned with bodily pleasures. And specifically, touch and taste.
He distinguishes from pleasures of the soul (e.g. learning, honour) from pleasures of the body.
Why such a narrow account? Aristotle seems very keen to draw a link between intemperance and being animalistic, and this is what motivates it.
Seems rather ad-hoc to exclude enjoyment of objects of sight, sounds, or smells (III.10, 1118a1-12); you might very well say that the vice of the person who watches lots of aesthetic TikTok videos is intemperate.
“The pleasures that concern temperance and intemperance are those that are shared with the other animals, and so appear slavish and bestial” (III.10, 1118a23-24)
And then he argues that taste plays a small part anyway, because intemperance is really about “the gratification that comes entirely through touch”, of eating and sex
The temperate person doesn’t find pleasure in the wrong things, but rather finds them disagreeable (III.11, 1119a11-13)
There’s a harmony internally, between the desiring and reasoning parts of the soul: “the temperate person’s appetitive part must agree with reason; for both [his appetitive part and his reason] aim at the fine” (III.12, 1119b15-18)
Temperance’s relationship with pleasure is the dual of bravery’s.
Bravery is firmness in the face of pain.
Temperance is resolution to avoid excessive pleasure; not being pained at the absence of pleasure (III.11, 1118b27-33)
Aristotle says that intemperance is more voluntary (and thus perhaps more blameworthy) than cowardice (III.12, 1119a21-25), though it’s not very convincingly argued.
Bravery usually requires you to do something difficult; intemperance requires you to exercise restraint. The former seems harder, especially as the pain that drives cowardice can ruin our nature and cause quasi-compulsive actions.
Magnificence (megaloprepeia), the virtue of fitting expenditure on a large scale.
It is a mean between stinginess and vulgarity (IV.2, 1122a25-32), separate from generosity.
This is like how Aristotle thinks that magnanimity is the virtue concerned with great honours, distinct from the virtue concerned with small honours.
So, clearly some virtues are inaccessible to people as a result of external factors, specifically lack of wealth.
“a poor person could not be magnificent [since] he lacks the means for large and fitting expenditures” (IV.2, 1122b27-29)
Generosity is the virtue about use of wealth.
It’s a mean between wastefulness and ungenerosity; the latter vice is worse than the former. (1121a15)
The context-dependence is clear: the amount of generosity should be in accord with the giver’s wealth.
Again, Aristotle emphasises giving for the sake of the fine, and to the right people.
There’s an asymmetry between receiving vs giving: it is better to give than to receive, because the former is more active.
Ungenerosity comes from both deficiency in giving and excess in taking
But wastefulness can lead to ungenerosity when you take money from bad sources
Aristotle claims tyrants and plunderers aren’t ungenerous – they’re wicked and unjust, because they’re motivated by domination/power. But gamblers and robbers are ungenerous, because they endure share for the sake of money.
Still, it seems like the robber is unjust too!
Other parts of character
Shame / modesty is not a virtue, but a feeling (II.7, 1108a32).
Having a sense of shame is appropriate for young people who are still developing their character, but not for a mature virtuous person, since they shouldn’t do anything shameful, and should act from positive motivation towards the good (IV.9)
Shame is only conditionally good, not good without qualification. The decent person won’t feel shame, because they won’t voluntarily do bad actions, and you only feel shame about voluntary actions
Shamelessness about bad actions is base, but that doesn’t mean that having shame is enough to make you decent
Mild-manneredness, a mean about anger
Emphasis on how the appropriate amount of anger depends a lot on the particulars. No anger when you ought to be angry isn’t good!
Again talks about how it’s better to lean to one side (the deficiency)
A mean between being ingratiating/flattering and being disagreeable
Similar to friendship, but it’s about people you’re not close with, too.
Some hint of consequentialism: the virtuous agent will act “in a way that is guided by the consequences (the noble and the advantageous)… And for the sake of great pleasure in the future, he will cause small pain now” (IV.6, 1127a4)
A mean between ambitiousness and unambitiousness, about small honours.