Commentary
In this passage from the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis), and suggests that there is a special kind of practical truth which phronesis in particular aims at. In this commentary, I will first briefly locate this passage in the context of the wider work, before focussing on two key claims it makes: first, that practical truth depends in an important way on desire; second, that there is a type of understanding specific to decision-making. The first idea is crucial for Aristotle’s argument that phronesis requires complete virtue of character, while the second helps him to defend the position that intellectual activity is a part of the highest human good – while each also links to other fundamental concepts in the Nicomachean Ethics like the human function (ergon) and the nature of the soul.
Book VI marks a transition point in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle moves from discussing the virtues of character to the virtues of thought. Aristotle’s division of the human soul into two parts – a rational part and a non-rational part, with the latter having a component which is capable of listening to reason (I.13, 1102b28-29) – leads naturally to this ordering: having established that the non-rational part is performing its function well when an individual has good character, Aristotle is now ready to explain what is required for the rational part to perform its function well. Earlier in Book VI, he further divides the rational part, into a subpart focussed on the necessary facts of science and a subpart focussed on deliberation (VI.1, 1138b7-9). The “thought concerned with study” is the former, while the “thought… concerned with action” is the latter. For each part, Aristotle asserts that its function is to seek out truth, since that is the characteristic activity of reason.
The second sentence of the passage highlights an important nuance in Aristotle’s conception of truth, however. While the function of the intellectual part of the rational soul seems to merely consist in arriving at accurate beliefs, the practical part has a further requirement that its conclusions must “agree… with correct desire”. This requirement might seem superfluous: given Aristotle’s emphasis in the passage of how phronesis is always about reaching a decision (prohairesis) and subsequently taking an action, why should desires come into it at all? As Coope (2012, p146) notes, it is not immediately obvious why the continent person – who takes actions in accordance with reason even though their desires would have them do otherwise – should lack phronesis, given that they are doing the same things that a fully virtuous agent would.
Before examining whether Aristotle can justify this dependence of phronesis on correct desire, it is worth exploring why he might want to show such a connection exists at all. In Book II, Aristotle defines virtue (arete) as “a state which decides… by reference to reason” (II.6, 1107a15), outlining how proper virtue of character depends on phronesis – a requirement perhaps made clearest in the discussion of justice and decency in Book V, where he emphasises that careful judgement is needed to arrive at the just outcome in cases where perfect legislation is impossible (1137b14-17). Establishing a dependency in the other direction too, such that phronesis relies on complete ethical excellence (ethike arete), would allow Aristotle to demonstrate that there is a unity to the virtues: each requires phronesis, which in turn requires ethike arete, and so the virtues must stay together like a neatly packaged bundle (Coope 2012, p147). Since possessing the virtues of character consists partly in a disposition to have appropriately fine desires, a quality which merely continent agents lack, Aristotle is able to restrict phronesis to only fully virtuous agents by stipulating that it needs the correct desires as well as actions.
Showing that “the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing with correct desire” would be a convenient conclusion, then – but is it a valid one? Aristotle certainly does not give much in the way of argument to support the claim, particularly given that the continent agent’s reasoning leads to the same good actions as the virtuous person’s, and yet apparently only the latter fulfils their function well. Coope (2012, p157) offers one potential justification: the continent person takes insufficient pleasure in the fineness of doing the right action, meaning they do not desire it as much as they ought to. This means that they have a defect in the functioning of the rational part of their soul where these desires, or wishes (bouleseis), are produced, and therefore cannot possess phronesis. Seen from this perspective, it is evident why Aristotle wanted the connection between practical truth and correct desire postulated in the passage, as well as how he might account for it through the rational part of the soul’s function in generating appropriate wishes.
Aristotle’s account of prohairesis in this passage points to understanding as a necessary component for decision, in addition to virtue and thought, but it is not obvious quite what relation he thinks this bears to the virtue of theoretical understanding (nous) discussed later in Book VI, about grasping the principles behind scientific facts (VI.6, 1141a9). At one point, Aristotle implies that there is a close analogy between understanding in the theoretical and the practical contexts (VI.11, 1134a37-b4), with Wiggins (1975, p236) suggesting that the thought might be that nous is about extremities: abstract generality in the theoretical sphere; specificity of particulars in the practical sphere. Any close similarity between the two types of understanding appears at odds with Aristotle’s view that practical wisdom requires experience, though. As he himself notes, young prodigies are able to attain impressive heights of scientific knowledge and understanding, but not prudence (NE VI.8, 1142a11-19). It would be strange, if the two types of understanding were fundamentally the same, that they were acquired in such different ways, and about entirely opposite extremes. Why does this matter? As Broadie (2020, p269) observes, Aristotle’s overall mission for the Nicomachean Ethics is to sketch out his account of human flourishing (eudaimonia) based on the ergon of exercising rationality in accordance with virtue. If phronesis bears no deep relationship with sophia, then it seems unlikely that this abstract theorising would be a part of the human function. Aristotle’s failure to deliver this connection via nous, as attempted in the passage, thus makes it harder for him to convincingly argue that sophia is constitutive of eudaimonia.
To conclude, this is an important passage both in its own right, as the point where Aristotle clearly sets out his distinction between the theoretical and practical virtues of thought, and as a contributor to Aristotle’s ongoing explanation of the connection between ethical virtue, rational thought, and flourishing. While there is a path for Aristotle to satisfactorily defend his first claim that phronesis depends on correct desire (and use it to set up his subsequent argument for the unity of the virtues), his suggestion that practical reason involves a kind of understanding analogous to that associated with scientific knowledge is rather more dubious – and this weakness undermines his attempt later in the Nicomachean Ethics to show that the exercise of theoretical wisdom is the highest human activity.
References
Broadie, Sarah. 2020. ‘Practical Truth in Aristotle’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 57, 249-272.
Coope, Ursula. 2012. ‘Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?’, Phronesis 57:2, 142–163.
Wiggins, David. 1975. ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’, in Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, University of California Press, 221-240.
Tutor’s feedback
As you can see from my comments, I think you succeeded at writing a very well-structured commentary on this passage that achieves the things we had previously jointly determined to characterise a strong commentary (contextualisation, accurate exposition and differentiation, and critical perspective brought out in a dialectical discussion). In the second part of the commentary, a little more signposting and guidance would have been beneficial, and the way that you position yourself to Coope’s suggestion could have been more explicit and clear. There were only very few and arguably minor inaccuracies that I marked above. The structure of your commentary, discussing two interrelated claims made in the passage above, gives us perhaps two different ways of shortening the commentary and bringing it into a format that is more appropriate for the exam (dropping the discussion of one of the claims or finding a way to discuss their interrelation in a shorter way), which we can discuss in the tutorial. Overall, this is very well-done and shows a very good understanding of the relevant notions in Aristotle as well as good critical distance and creative argumentation.