‘Consequentialism is impossibly demanding. So it cannot be correct.’ Discuss.

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Although some forms of consequentialism are extremely demanding (though not impossibly so), the same can be said of certain deontological theories – and in any case this property of demandingness should not have any bearing on our assessment of a moral theory’s correctness. Consequentialist theories are uniquely demanding only if one’s conception of demandingness focusses exclusively on the demands a morality makes of agents, but this is an assumption which already rejects consequentialism in claiming that there is a morally relevant doing/allowing distinction. Moreover, there is no convincing reason why a correct moral theory should not make large demands of agents. In this essay, I first clarify what we mean by the demandingness of a moral theory, showing that if we do not presuppose a non-consequentialist position, some deontological theories appear unreasonably demanding. Then, I demonstrate that not all forms of consequentialism are demanding, even on a non-consequentialist's view of demandingness. Finally, I argue that no consequentialist theory makes impossible demands of agents, and conclude that, whether or not a theory is consequentialist, the fact that it makes substantial demands of individuals is insufficient grounds for its rejection.

What does it mean to say that an ethical theory is demanding? As McElwee (2017) notes, there are many cases we may disagree with a theory’s claim that an agent has a moral obligation to do something, but not all of these should be classified as demandingness objections. If theory $T_1$ requires me to stand on my head each Monday, my grounds for rejecting $T_1$ are that it is simply wrong about what matters morally, not that it is overly demanding. To oppose $T_1$ on account of its demandingness, I would need to concede that there are good moral reasons for me to stand on my head, but hold that all things considered, the costs to me of doing so are such that any theory which requires that is asking too much. We should therefore define the demandingness of a theory in terms of the costs it imposes on individuals bound to act in accordance with it: a theory T is more demanding on an individual than T’ if over the course of their lifetime, the expected costs of complying with T are greater than the costs of complying T’, relative to ignoring morality entirely (Sobel 2016, pp243-4).

Consider now theory $T_2$, which requires me to donate a kidney to a stranger. Certainly this theory is more demanding on me than a theory $T_3$ which does not require me to donate my kidney. But in order to talk about the demandingness of a theory simpliciter, we need some way of transforming the demands of $T_2$ and $T_3$ respectively on each individual into a single amount-of-demandingness quantity. If Sally will die without my kidney, $T_3$ seems to demand a huge amount from her, in permitting me to not donate it, and additionally prohibiting her from forcibly obtaining the kidney (Sobel 2016, p241). The only way to decisively conclude that $T_2$ is more demanding than $T_3$ is by arguing that some sorts of costs are more demanding than others: specifically, that it is more demanding to require that I take a costly action than it is to demand that Sally accepts her misfortune. Yet this method of assessing demandingness presupposes a morally relevant difference between costs borne by agents and costs borne by patients, which is a non-consequentialist premiss. Indeed, a consequentialist might well argue that $T_3$ is overall the more demanding theory, because (by their lights) the aggregated costs of compliance are greater than those of $T_2$. Similarly, a critic might describe as overly demanding a theory $T_4$ which requires me to abandon my personal projects to do life-saving charity work, but have no qualms accepting a theory $T_5$ which prohibits me from engaging in projects which involve torturing others. Again, though, this conclusion rests on a non-consequentialist assumption – in this case, a distinction between doing harms and allowing harms. We cannot formulate a demandingness objection to a theory without relying on some prior beliefs which are fundamentally opposed to it, and so the fact that a theory appears demanding is not a reason to reject it.

Bibliography

Kagan, S., 1984. Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13, 239-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265413

McElwee, B. (2017). Demandingness Objections in Ethics. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67(266), 84-105. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44505417

Sobel, D., 2016. The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection, in From Valuing to Value. Oxford University Press (Ch. 12). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712640.003.0013

Woollard, F., 2016. V—Dimensions of Demandingness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(1), 89–106, https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow003