Although some forms of consequentialism are extremely demanding (though not impossibly so), the same can be said of certain deontological theories –
and in any case this property of demandingness should not have any bearing on our assessment of a moral theory’s correctness. Consequentialist
theories are uniquely demanding only if one’s conception of demandingness focusses exclusively on the demands a morality makes of agents, but this is
an assumption which already rejects consequentialism in claiming that there is a morally relevant doing/allowing distinction. Moreover, there is no
convincing reason why a correct moral theory should not make large demands of agents. In this essay, I first clarify what we mean by the demandingness
of a moral theory, showing that if we do not presuppose a non-consequentialist position, some deontological theories appear unreasonably demanding.
Then, I demonstrate that not all forms of consequentialism are demanding, even on a non-consequentialist's view of demandingness.
Finally, I argue that no consequentialist theory makes impossible demands of agents, and
conclude that, whether or not a theory is consequentialist, the fact that it makes substantial demands of individuals is insufficient grounds for its
rejection.
What does it mean to say that an ethical theory is demanding? As McElwee (2017) notes, there are many cases we may disagree with a theory’s claim that an agent has a moral obligation to do something, but not all of these should be classified as demandingness objections. If theory $T_1$ requires me to stand on my head each Monday, my grounds for rejecting $T_1$ are that it is simply wrong about what matters morally, not that it is overly demanding. To oppose $T_1$ on account of its demandingness, I would need to concede that there are good moral reasons for me to stand on my head, but hold that all things considered, the costs to me of doing so are such that any theory which requires that is asking too much. We should therefore define the demandingness of a theory in terms of the costs it imposes on individuals bound to act in accordance with it: a theory T is more demanding on an individual than T’ if over the course of their lifetime, the expected costs of complying with T are greater than the costs of complying T’, relative to ignoring morality entirely (Sobel 2016, pp243-4).
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Phrased differently, McElwee describes the demandingness objection as being present in cases where “doing A is what is morally best, and what is overall best, but is not morally obligatory because the cost to the agent is too great.”
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At this point, it is worth briefly examining the nature of moral obligations. Consequentialist theories, by their nature, offer an ordering over states, and actions to be taken in a given state. Given this information, it is something of an empty question to ask “Is action A obligatory?”, because the answer is immaterial. One could adopt a satisficing version of consequentialism which arbitrarily deem an action permissible only if it yields at least P% goodness as the optimal one, but the fact would still remain that certain permissible actions are better than others. Since in consequentialism the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of actions is somewhat independent from their wrongness or rightness (as blaming and praising are simply actions to be decided on under a standard consequentialist framework), it is not decision-relevant to others whether or not the action an agent took was permissible – all that matters is the consequences that are (expected to be) produced. So, adopting a scalar form of consequentialism which does concerns not itself with calling actions obligatory or impermissible would entirely do away with any demandingness objections.
Consider now theory $T_2$, which requires me to donate a kidney to a stranger. Certainly this theory is more demanding on me than a theory $T_3$ which does not require me to donate my kidney. But in order to talk about the demandingness of a theory simpliciter, we need some way of transforming the demands of $T_2$ and $T_3$ respectively on each individual into a single amount-of-demandingness quantity. If Sally will die without my kidney, $T_3$ seems to demand a huge amount from her, in permitting me to not donate it, and additionally prohibiting her from forcibly obtaining the kidney (Sobel 2016, p241). The only way to decisively conclude that $T_2$ is more demanding than $T_3$ is by arguing that some sorts of costs are more demanding than others: specifically, that it is more demanding to require that I take a costly action than it is to demand that Sally accepts her misfortune. Yet this method of assessing demandingness presupposes a morally relevant difference between costs borne by agents and costs borne by patients, which is a non-consequentialist premiss. Indeed, a consequentialist might well argue that $T_3$ is overall the more demanding theory, because (by their lights) the aggregated costs of compliance are greater than those of $T_2$. Similarly, a critic might describe as overly demanding a theory $T_4$ which requires me to abandon my personal projects to do life-saving charity work, but have no qualms accepting a theory $T_5$ which prohibits me from engaging in projects which involve torturing others. Again, though, this conclusion rests on a non-consequentialist assumption – in this case, a distinction between doing harms and allowing harms. We cannot formulate a demandingness objection to a theory without relying on some prior beliefs which are fundamentally opposed to it, and so the fact that a theory appears demanding is not a reason to reject it.
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Not all consequentialist theories are demanding: ethical egoism is certainly consequentialist, but according to our definition above (where demandingness is in terms of costs above what would be felt complying with no moral theory), it has a demandingness of exactly zero for self-interested agents.
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Moreover, no consequentialist theory is impossibly demanding. (For ease of exposition, I demonstrate this only for simple act utilitarianism, but the same argument applies to other consequentialist theories.)
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The act utilitarian criterion of rightness states that an action is right if out of all actions open to an agent, no other leads to more moral value, where moral value is the impartial sum of all morally relevant individuals’ welfare. According to maximising act utilitarianism, the optimal action is the only permissible one, and it is obligatory. But from this definition, there is no way for act utilitarianism to make impossible demands. If an action A is right (and thus required of an agent), then it must be one of the actions open to that agent. Humans are not able to work 24 hours every day earning money to give to charity, and utilitarianism would never make an impossible demand such as this, since the option of working 24 hours each day is not open to any agent.
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To reiterate, demandingness is not a good reason to reject a theory. Ethical egoism is highly undemanding, but that isn’t even a pro tanto reason to favour it. If we are unhappy with “unreasonable” demands, this is a symptom of an underlying disagreement with its premisses, as opposed to an objection to the theory’s demandingness per se.
Bibliography
Kagan, S., 1984. Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13, 239-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265413
McElwee, B. (2017). Demandingness Objections in Ethics. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67(266), 84-105. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44505417
Sobel, D., 2016. The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection, in From Valuing to Value. Oxford University Press (Ch. 12). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712640.003.0013
Woollard, F., 2016. V—Dimensions of Demandingness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(1), 89–106, https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow003